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3“But the decision not to use theories of man’s economic behavior, even
hypothetically, limits the value to economic science and to the maker of policies, of
the results obtained or obtainable by the methods developed. This decision greatly
restricts the benefit that might be secured from the use of modern methods of 
statistical inference.”
Tjalling C. Koopmans, ‘Measurement Without Theory’, The Review of Economic
Statistics, 29(3): 172, August 1947.
“. . . as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We
also know there are known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don’t know we
don’t know.”
Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defence news briefing (transcript) February 12, 
2002
1 Introduction
In the United Kingdom the “Knowledge Economy” is/was seen as the core policy for
economic growth. In the US, they have/had the ‘Digital Economy’, the ‘New Economy’
or the ‘Innovation Economy’. Australia created the “National Office for the Information
Economy” as an agency to stimulate economic growth. Add to these, the ‘Information
Society’, the ‘Network Society’ and the ‘Learning Society’ and we have a potentially
confusing mix of terminology, potential drivers and importantly, consequences of action
and inaction. In New Zealand the central importance of the drive for a Knowledge-based
economy was recently reiterated by Hon Dr Michael Cullen in his 2006 address to the
AUS conference where he stated that “Our aim is a high income, knowledge based
economy, which is both innovative and creative and provides a unique quality of life to all
New Zealanders”. He further noted that “the innovation that drives higher productivity
comes from investment in science and technology; it comes from research and higher skill
levels” (Cullen 2006).
Debates around the need to establish a knowledge society (and the implications of
not doing so) emerged during the 1990s, as the impact of ICT based upon the creation,
4recording, and distribution of knowledge and information became increasingly clear, as
did the significance of New Zealand developing its own identity as a knowledge society
within an increasingly global information network. “Knowledge Wave” and “World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)” conferences championing education and
Information Technology as the ‘magic bullets’ to create successes for all. The Knowledge
Society should grow, so the argument goes, so that the economy grows and with it the
welfare, health and wellbeing of all. “Knowledge” is assumed to be good for everyone
(how can more knowledge be bad?) and we should strive to create ways to increase its
quantity and quality, (perhaps) focussing specifically on science-based education.
The gloss may have been taken off some of these notions and expectations due to
the dotcom and stock market crashes of 2000-2002, but Alcaly (2003: 3) claims:
“ [w]hile the euphoria of the late 1990s, like the melancholia that
displaced it, was far overdone, there was always a more fundamental sense
in which the economy of the 1980s and 1990s truly was new, a
characterisation that has not been undermined by the corrections that
inevitably, and temporarily, slowed its growth in the first few years of the
twenty-first century.”
When one digs deeper, however, the gloss does peel. The world has embraced a set of
concepts (knowledge driven growth) which are seen as the ‘core of future growth and
wellbeing’ without any commonly agreed notion of what they are, how they might be
measured, and crucially therefore, how they actually do (or might) affect economic
growth and social wellbeing. The theory of how the mechanism works lacks important
detail. In economic theorising and policymaking, the relationship between knowledge,
economic growth, and knowledge economy and knowledge society are not clearly
articulated. In both academic and political debate, terms like knowledge economy,
knowledge society and new economy, etc., are used interchangeably, but are they and do
5they have the same structural/causal interpretations/consequences? The current state of
academic knowledge has not adequately and systematically addressed these fundamental
issues.
Economic theory provides potential answers to part of the puzzle via ‘modern
growth theory’ championed by Romer (1986, 1990), and Lucas (1988), which recognise
the crucial importance of ‘knowledge embodied in human beings’, ‘human capital, as an
engine for growth’, ‘Research and Development sectors’, etc. However, this economics-
based literature, though typically ‘theoretical’, is often too narrowly defined to consider
social issues and hence not well placed to consider the knowledge society. It does,
however, suffer from some significant ‘problems of measurement’1, but more
fundamentally the emergence and domination in production of ‘knowledge only firms’
have the potential to challenge the textbook microeconomic ‘theory of the firm’ based on
the work of Grossman and Hart (1986, 1987) and Hart and Moore (1990).
From a sociological perspective the knowledge society is, to some, the latest form of
accumulation to become a significant part of economic wealth generation. The ‘theory’
underpinning the analysis is a mix of technological/economic ‘determinism’. The
knowledge society leads to the "emergence of new forms of economic production and
management” Castells (1996). To others, however, knowledge is an enabling concept
leading to a culture of innovation which creates the knowledge society. Recent analysis
of social inclusion, social connectedness and social cohesiveness leads to an increased
emphasis on education, human capital theories and schemes to reconnect those who have
‘fallen out of the system” and arguments around dependency. However, the current state
of sociological thinking on the contours of the knowledge “society” remains rather
indistinct and certainly lacks robust measures see, McLennan (2003) and Jessop (2000).
1 See Woßmann, (2003).
6The “current state of knowledge” on the knowledge society, therefore comprises a
range of partial, typically discipline specific and determined, limited views, thoughts and
concepts. No robust measures of its size and importantly contours exist, and hence no
rigorous, scientific analyses of its effects on wellbeing have or could have been
undertaken.
What of the benefits and costs of the ‘new’ knowledge economy/society? Will those
without specialised information processing\transformation skills remain ‘outside the
knowledge club’ whilst those with these skills benefit at their expense. Just who will be
the ‘winners and losers’?
Many commentators have suggested a link between the computer revolution and
increasing wage inequality. As Katz (2000: 217) points out,
“[w]age inequality and educational wage differentials have expanded
substantially in the United States over the past two decades. This widening
of the wage structure has coincided with the rapid computerization of the
workplace. Thus, it is not surprising that many labor market analysts have
tried to draw a causal connection between rising earnings inequality and
increases in the growth rate of the relative demand for more-skilled workers
driven by technological and organizational changes associated with the
computer revolution.”
Driven by the increased access to information resulting from the ever expanding reach of
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) more new information can be
created by those with ‘knowledge-creation capacities’ than has been the case in the past.
This may enable a new production paradigm less constrained by traditional diminishing
returns to scale (the New Economy), but the distribution of resulting gains remains an
unresolved issue.
Those talking of the ‘New Economy’ or ‘Goldilocks Economy’ seem to be alluding
7to what they perceive as a shift towards a post-industrial economy driven by the adoption
of new technologies and business practices which expand the role of human capital in
production. If knowledge, either disembodied or embodied in human capital, is the source
of new economies of scale in production, then the lack of it in ‘economically poorer’
economies may actually exacerbate the ‘knowledge divide’ despite the appearance that the
information\digital divide is narrowing. Accessing ‘knowledge’ we would argue
necessarily requires accessing the creators\assimilators of knowledge and these are
inherently ‘human’ and not technologies alone. ICTs and people are complements, not
substitutes.
If we accept we are in a knowledge economy\society, how large is it? How do we
measure knowledge? What of their effects on the economy and society? Is it even
meaningful to try and measure these things if we have no generally agreed upon
definitions of knowledge, information, the knowledge economy\society? The meanings
attached to knowledge and information in the literature are vague and imprecise. As for
the idea of a knowledge or information economy\society, there are, seemingly, as many
definitions as people writing about them. Some authors suggest that there is no coherent 
definition, at best we are dealing with an often used metaphor, rather than a well thought
out concept.
To progress debate on the knowledge economy/society, in this paper we will raise a
number of questions/challenges and propose a number of routes to the answers. In section
2 we will briefly consider the existing literature on the knowledge economy/society.
Section 3 will consider what is crucial in the search for ‘measurement’, the distinction
between ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’. This will be followed in section 4 by a review of
how we currently attempt to measure what amounts to the impact of ICTs and considers
the challenges a knowledge-based economy poses for System of National Accounts-type
8statistical framework. Section 5 returns to a core element of the theme of our paper,
‘measurement without theory’. Here we consider what modern economic theory has to
say about the ‘theory of the knowledge firm’ and generally find it lacking. Section 6
considers some ‘potential points of departure and potential for progress’ and section 7
concludes.
2 What is the knowledge economy\society?
The emergence of a debate about the arrival of the “Knowledge Economy and Society’
came when industrial societies began to be restructured and transformed into ones with a
greater dependency upon “information” based areas of activity. One of the earliest authors
to emphasise the importance of knowledge to society was Machlup (1962). Writers such
as Drucker (1959, 1969, 1994) and Bell (1973) saw this as part of a move towards a “post-
industrial” economy and society. The initial focus on “information” shifted in the 1970s to
a greater emphasis on “knowledge”. This was accompanied by a re-emphasis on ‘human
capital’ as an individual good, which enhanced the earning capacity of the individual and
recognised more strongly their contribution to overall wealth generation. This stimulated
attention to innovators, entrepreneurs, and knowledge managers as the key to economic
growth and change. Increased attention to the rights and capacities of the individual within
society more generally, as part of a wider liberalization and deregulation of economic and
social activities, also gathered strength during the latter decades of the 20th century
(Giddens 1991, 2001, Beck 1999). The linkages between the increased importance of
knowledge as the reason for economic growth and wider social transformation became a
theme in much of the writing that emerges. For example Stehr wrote that: “. . . central to
my thesis is that the origin, social structure and development of the knowledge societies is
linked first and foremost to a radical transformation to the structure of the economy” 
9(Stehr 1994: 122).
Economists typically (but not exclusively) focus more narrowly than sociologists
upon the changed role of knowledge in economic activity see Boulding (1966), Arrow
(1962), Stiglitz (1999) and Cowan, David and Foray, (2000). The OECD for example,
define a knowledge based economy (KBE) as “. . . economies, which are directly based on
the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information” (OECD 1996: 7). In
both the work of sociologists and economists it is the importance of the digital
technologies, the Internet, computers, information and globalised networks that these
technologies enable that have been stressed. It is now the “age of speed”. Time and space
have been compressed (Harvey 1989, Virillio 2004). There is an increasing shift of
activities to computers rather than these being carried out in specific locations. Testing of 
products can now be done through simulation on the computer. People can work from
home (Felstead et al 2005, Leonard and Thorns 2006). People can create virtual worlds in
“my space” and live out their lives in cyberspace. Whilst not all are involved in these
activities it does extend the range of possibilities and gives more prominence to ‘mental’
labour rather than physical labour carried out in discrete places. Knowledge is now seen
as the primary source of competitiveness and the desire of governments is increasingly to
create innovative and ‘smart citizens’. Extending what constitutes knowledge to the
“cultural and creative” sector is now incorporated into the discourse on the knowledge
society as this sector has gained increased recognition as a potential contributor to
economic growth.
One problem with the knowledge society debate is that there seems to be as many
definitions of the knowledge economy\society as there are authors writing about it. Smith
(2002: 6-7) asks “[w]hat does it mean to speak of the ‘knowledge economy’ however? At
the outset, it must be said that there is no coherent definition, let alone theoretical concept, 
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of this term: it is at best a widely-used metaphor, rather than a clear concept. The OECD
has spoken of knowledge-based economies in very general terms, as meaning “those
which are directly based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and
information”. This definition is a good example of the problems of the term, for it seems
to cover everything and nothing: all economies are in some way based on knowledge, but
it is hard to think that any are directly based on knowledge, if that means the production
and distribution of knowledge and information products.”
Foss (2002: 48) argues that, “[w]hatever we think of this journalistic concept [of the
Knowledge Economy], it arguably does capture real tendencies and complementary
changes.” What might these ‘new’ tendencies be?
“We define the knowledge economy as production and services based on 
knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to an accelerated pace of
technical and scientific advance, as well as rapid obsolescence. The key 
component of a knowledge economy is a greater reliance on intellectual
capabilities than on physical inputs or natural resources” (Powell and
Snellnllan, 2004).
Here the ‘modern’ emphasis seems to be on ‘knowledge’ ‘accelerated technical and
scientific advance’ and ‘greater reliance on intellectual capabilities than physical inputs or
natural resources’.
For an economist the question has been, Is the “Knowledge Economy” a new
economic paradigm, with new fundamentals or is it just “hype”? Is this all new? Marshall
(1920: Book IV Chapter 1 page 115) states that “[k]nowledge is our most powerful engine
of production; it enables us to subdue Nature and force her to satisfy our wants.” But the
importance of knowledge to the economy goes much further back. When discussing the
question, What happened to the Neanderthals? Tudge (1998: 25) argues
“[t]he Cro-Magnons . . . got to know the habits of the animals they hunted
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and knew where to lie in wait; and different bands shared information, so
hunting parties could be forewarned of migrations days in advance.” He
goes on to say “[m]ost importantly of all . . . the Cro-Magnons co-operated:
that they traded tools - for which there is abundant evidence - and also
traded information. Thus . . . the age of trade (and of information) is
exceedingly ancient” Tudge (1998: 26).
So the argument that the knowledge economy is new, in a historical time sense, is
unconvincing but it may be new in the relative importance of the factors of production
compared to the past. In a crude sense, has knowledge changed from being ‘a’ factor of
production to being ‘the’ factor of production?
The sociologists, on the other hand, have asked, Is the ‘Knowledge Society’ (KS)
fundamentally different from what preceded it? The first issue we face is one of 
potentially viewing a process rather than an outcome. The past periods of transformation,
such as the industrial revolution, have occurred. For those studying the ‘knowledge
society’ the twin problems of definitional limitations and the potential lack of a complete 
historical lens complicate analysis. We may simply conclude ‘the world is no different to
the past’ simply because change is incomplete.
From the work that has been done to date it is clear there is considerable
disagreement as to the central components of either the knowledge economy or knowledge
society which complicates the development of robust measures (Carlaw et al 2006). There
have been a variety of attempts to create measures for the KBE and KS. For example
APEC defined a KBE as “an economy in which production, distribution and the use of 
knowledge is the main driver of growth, wealth creation and employment across all
industries” (APEC 2000: vii). However, they also acknowledge there are few indicators
that directly measure the extent to which a country is already operating as a KBE as
distinct from its capacity to become a KBE. The indicators that are favoured would be the
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percentage of GDP contributed by the knowledge based industries and the percentage of
the labour force that consists of knowledge workers. To apply these measures would still
require the resolution of who are ‘knowledge workers’. Is this to be determined by the task
they perform, by their formal qualifications or by their outputs and degree to which they
are dependant upon the global networks and new information flows? Further there is the 
consideration of the fact that to be a ‘knowledge worker’ implies that they transform
information rather than just receive it passively. This leads us to a focus on the contribution
of human capital and its generation and maintenance. There is also the complication of the
differing forms of knowledge that are now being recognised, especially the di erence
between codified and tacit knowledge. Houghton and Sheehan (2000: 1) recognise this
where they write, quoting the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK (Department of
Trade and Industry 1998):
“A knowledge economy is one in which knowledge is a key
resource. ...one in which the generation and the exploitation of
knowledge has come to play the predominate part in the creation of
wealth. It is not simply about pushing back the frontiers of
knowledge; it also about the more effective use and exploitation of
all types of knowledge in all manner of economic activity.”
To deal adequately with the dimensions identified would require measures that allow us to 
understand the knowledge inputs and outputs, flows of knowledge and the stock of 
knowledge (OECD 1996).One of the disputed areas here relates to what counts as
knowledge. Here sociological work has pointed to this as a contested arena and reflective 
of local priorities and decisions about the privileging of particular forms of knowledge
generating activity with respect to for example, the public funding of R&D. Widening the
scope of what gets included is also being suggested as in the recent work of the US
13
Progressive Policy Institute where they suggest
“. . . the New Economy is about the transformation of all industries and the
overall economy. As such, the New Economy represents a complex array of
forces. These include the reorganization of firms, more efficient and dynamic
capital markets, more economic “churning” and entrepreneurial dynamism,
relentless globalization, continuing economic competition, and increasingly
volatile labor markets” (Atkinson 2003: 4).
To provide a way of measuring these complex shifts they suggest 21 indicators divided
into five categories which are knowledge jobs, globalization, economic dynamism and 
competition, transformation to a digital economy and technical capacity.
The idea of a knowledge society has been employed more, than the KBE, in wider
discourse about change within society and the focus has been more on the creative
potential and knowledge embodied in people. The UN work here sees
“ICTs are best considered as tools or facilitators which may substitute under
certain conditions for other means of knowledge creation in innovative
societies (OECD 1996a). These technologies do not create the transformations
in society by themselves; they are designed and implemented by people in their
social, economic, and technological contexts” (Mansell and Wehn 1998: 12).
The UN has developed two measures to attempt to measure these changes . The first 
being the ‘ICT Diffusion Index’ (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
2006) which is designed to measure ICT connectivity (number of internet host per capita
and number of telephone lines per capita) and the second the ‘Index of Knowledge
Societies’ (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2005) which attempts to measure
the ‘foresightedness a country displays in its quest to become a “knowledge society”’.
However, much ambiguity still exists and the measures are not precise as the UNESCO
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World report ‘Towards Knowledge Societies’ acknowledges where it states,
“While there is general agreement on the appropriateness of the expression
(Knowledge Societies), the same cannot be said of the content. Which types of
knowledge are we talking about? Do we have to endorse the hegemony of the
techno-scientific model in defining legitimate and productive knowledge? And 
what of the imbalances that mark access to knowledge and the obstacles
confronting it both locally and globally?” (UNESCO 2005: 5).
One of the more comprehensive attempts to create such a range of measures is the
INEXSK framework (Infrastructure, Experience, Skills, and Knowledge), see Mansell
and Wehn (1998). It uses eight indicators chosen on the basis of their availability and
value in provoking thought about different patterns of development in Knowledge
Societies. The eight indices are - personal computers per capita, main telephone lines per
capita, electronics consumption, proportion of technical graduates, literacy share
(percentage population literate), Internet hosts and televisions sets per 1000 population.
This range certainly extends the areas being examined but still to a large extent is driven
by data availability and provides at best only a fairly crude metric. For example, the
number of Internet connections or ownership of personal computers does not show the
speed or utilisation or quality of these devices and connectivity both of which are crucial
to the ability to maintain access to the expanding world of information and knowledge
now available.
3 Forms of information and knowledge
As shown in Carlaw et al (2006), the words ‘information’ and\or ‘knowledge’ are
attached to various definitions or concepts. The recent UNESCO Report (2005) uses the 
terms interchangeably, for example,
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“the rise of the global information society has allowed a considerable mass of
information or knowledge to be disseminated via the leading media. However,
the different social groups are far from having equal access and capacity to
assimilate this growing flow of information or knowledge” (UNESCO Report
2005: 160)
Beyond knowledge we have ‘wisdom’ which in McKenna and Rooney (2005) is defined 
as something that “coordinates knowledge and judgements about the ‘fundamental
pragmatics of life’ ...knowledge with extraordinary scope, depth and balance . . .
excellence of judgement and advice.” The picture becomes only more confusing when
the term ‘data’ is also used. Despite efforts by various authors to define terms like ‘data’,
‘information’ and ‘knowledge’, the terms are used, in many cases, casually, with
information and knowledge often being used interchangeably. Table 1, from Stenmark
(2002: 1), illustrates that the definitions of the three terms are usually imprecise and 
vague. In addition, as Stenmark also points out, the relationship between the terms,
although far from trivial, is seldom clarified.
Table 1: Definitions of data, information, and knowledge (Stenmark 2002)
16
One interesting approach to the problem of definition is that of Howitt who defines 
knowledge
“. . . in terms of potentially observable behaviour, as the ability of an
individual or group of individuals to undertake, or to instruct or
otherwise induce others to undertake, procedures resulting in predictable
transformations of material objects. The knowledge can be codified, as 
when it is transmitted by mathematical theorems or computer programs
that can be reproduced through known procedures; or it can be tacit, as
when it exists only in the minds of particular individuals or in the
established routines of organizations, and is not capable of routine
transmission or reproduction” Howitt (1996: 11).
Such a definition places restrictions on whom or what can possess knowledge. In
particular knowledge is restricted to the capabilities of individuals and organisations. This
definition also rules out knowledge in the abstract. For Howitt things like books, blue-
prints and computer programs are tools that people can use for creating similar knowledge
not just ways for them to use previously existing knowledge. Howitt’s view changes the
usual distinction between the production and diffusion of knowledge. This is so because it
suggests that the reader of a book, say, creates knowledge much as the original writer did.
The difference between the two is the process by which the knowledge is created and the
degree to which the new knowledge substitutes for already existing knowledge. The
book’s author would, we assume, have spent much more time and e ort on creating
knowledge than would the reader; and the knowledge created would have had much
greater scarcity value at the time of writing than the knowledge created by any reader of
the work. Any time a reader of the book sets out to learn from the book, most of the
knowledge gained will come from the book, but some will be novel.
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Jensen and Meckling (1995: 4) make a distinction between “[s]pecific knowledge 
[which] is knowledge that is costly to transfer among agents and general knowledge
[which] is knowledge that is inexpensive to transmit.” These ideas seem closely related to
tacit and codifiable (or explicit) knowledge. Tacit knowledge because of its very nature is
costly to transfer while explicit knowledge is cheaper and easier to convey to others.
ICTs embody knowledge, typically in the form of physical devices like cellphones,
computer terminals, etc. Such devices utilise or transmit and\or receive information, but
enumerating them reveals nothing about society’s ‘knowledge stocks or flows’. Counting 
computers does not tells us anything about the knowledge and understanding of their
users. Knowledge will be required to create ICTs, but their existence, stock and growth
rates alone do not represent the growth or otherwise of the knowledge society\economy.
They may however represent and measure the growth of an information using society,
though it will be imperfect unless we know something about utilisation rates rather than
simple stocks levels. Creating more and cheaper access to the Internet via broadband,
computer terminals, freeware etc., may increase the flow and diffusion of information but
this does come with an associated risk of a decrease in the quality of the ‘information’ -
for example in such sources as Wikipedia. Wikipedia entries can be written by anyone no
matter what their level of knowledge of the subject matter. Such a process lacks the more
traditional quality assessment of, say, a refereeing process for a book or journal article.
There may be more apparent equity in access to the inputs, but there still remains an elite
of knowledge-output creators\diffusers.
Investing more in R&D may facilitate the creation of knowledge, but this requires
the knowledge creators\diffusers to work with the necessary R&D equipment to create
this new knowledge. Once codifiable, this knowledge may be disseminated as a form of 
‘new information’. Those receiving this new information must be able to assimilate\use it
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- that is they need to have the necessary mental tools (human capital) to process it and
potentially use it to create yet more new knowledge. Education has an important role here
as a means of processing\producing knowledge from the accessible information. Patents
are a particular form of ‘codified technical knowledge’, which often results from R&D, 
measures of which are easily accessible. However, ‘secrecy’ is sometimes used to protect
commercially valuable technical knowledge as the patent application requires the full
disclosure of the new technology. The classic case here is the obvious one of the Coca
Cola recipe.
5 Mr Bean(counter) measures the economy
Much time and effort is expended by many national and many international organisations
in an attempt to measure the economy or economies of the world. While the measuring of
the “standard” economy is funny enough, when we move to the measurement of the
“knowledge economy” measurement goes from the mildly humorous to the outright
hilarious. Most attempts to measure, or even define, the information or knowledge 
economy border on the farcical: the movie version should be called, Mr Bean(counter)
Measures the Economy.
There are substantial challenges to be overcome in any attempt to measure the
knowledge society\economy. These are at both the theoretical and the method level. A
more consistent set of definitions is required as are more robust measures that are derived 
from theory rather than from what is currently or conveniently available. In order to
identify the size and composition of the KBE one inevitably faces the issue of quantifying
its extent and composition. Economists and national statistical organisations are naturally
drawn to the workhorse of the ‘System of National Accounts’ as a source of such data.
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Introduced during WWII as a measure of wartime production capacity, the change in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has become widely used as a measure of economic
growth. However, GDP has significant difficulties in interpretation and usage (especially
as a measure of wellbeing) which has led to the development of both ‘satellite accounts’ -
additions to the original system to handle issues such as the ‘tourism sector’; ‘transitional
economies’ and the ‘not-for-profit sector’ and alternative measures for example, the 
Human Development Indicator and Gross National Happiness . GDP is simply a gross
tally of products and services bought and sold, with no distinctions between transactions
that add to well-being, and those that diminish it. It assumes that every monetary
transaction adds to well-being, by definition. Organisations like the ABS and OECD have 
adopted certain implicit\explicit definitions, typically of the Information Economy-type,
and mapped these ideas into a strong emphasis on impacts and consequences of ICTs.
The website (http://www.oecd.org/sti/information-economy) for the OECD’s Information
Economy Unit states that the unit:
“. . . examines the economic and social implications of the
development, diffusion and use of ICTs, the Internet and e-business.
It analyses ICT policy frameworks shaping economic growth
productivity, employment and business performance. In particular,
the Working Party on the Information Economy (WPIE) focuses on
digital content, ICT diffusion to business, global value chains, ICT-
enabled o shoring, ICT skills and employment and the publication of
the OECD Information Technology Outlook.”
Furthermore, the OECD’s Working Party on Indicators for the Information
Society has
“. . . agreed on a number of standards for measuring ICT. They cover
the definition of industries producing ICT goods and services (the
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“ICT sector”), a classification for ICT goods, the definitions of 
electronic commerce and Internet transactions, and model
questionnaires and methodologies for measuring ICT use and e-
commerce by businesses, households and individuals. All the
standards have been brought together in the 2005 publication, Guide
to Measuring the Information Society . . . “
(http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_201185_34508886_1_
1_1_1, 00.html).
The whole emphasis is on ICTs. For example, the OECD’s “Guide to Measuring the
Information Society” has chapter headings that show that their major concern is with
ICTs. Chapter 2 covers ICT products; Chapter 3 deals with ICT infrastructure; Chapter 4
concerns ICT supply; Chapter 5looks at ICT demand by businesses; while Chapter 6
covers ICT demand by households and individuals. The schematic that shows the
conceptual model the OECD uses for thinking about statistics on the Information Society
also shows this ICT dependence. See below for the figure. 
As will be shown below several authors have discussed the requirements for, and
problems with, the measurement of the knowledge\information economy. As noted above
most of the data on which the measures of the knowledge economy are based comes from
the national accounts of the various countries involved. This does raise the question as to
whether or not the said accounts are suitably designed for this purpose. There are a
number of authors who suggest that in fact the national accounts are not the appropriate
vehicle for this task. Peter Howitt argues that:
“. . . the theoretical foundation on which national income accounting is based
is one in which knowledge is fixed and common, where only prices and 
quantities of commodities need to be measured. Likewise, we have no
generally accepted empirical measures of such key theoretical concepts as the
stock of technological knowledge, human capital, the resource cost of
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knowledge acquisition, the rate of innovation or the rate of obsolescence of
old knowledge” (Howitt 1996: 10).
Howitt goes on to make the case that because we can not measure correctly the input to
and the output of, the creation and use of knowledge, our traditional measure of GNP and
productivity give a misleading picture of the state of the economy. Howitt further claims
that the failure to develop a separate investment account for knowledge, in much the same
manner as we do for physical capital, results in much of the economy’s output being
missed by the national income accounts.
Figure from WPIIS (2005: 9).
In Carter (1996) six problems in measuring the knowledge economy were identified: 
1) The properties of knowledge itself make measuring it difficult,
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2) Qualitative changes in conventional goods: the knowledge component of a good
or service can change making it difficult to evaluate their “levels of output” over
time,
3) Changing boundaries of producing units: for firms within a knowledge economy, 
the boundaries between firms and markets are becoming harder to distinguish, 
4) Changing externalities and the externalities of change: spillovers are increasingly
important in an knowledge economy,
5) Distinguishing ‘meta-investments’ from the current account: some investments
are general purpose investments in the sense that they allow all employees to be
more efficient,
6) Creative destruction and the “useful life” of capital: knowledge can become
obsolete very quickly and as it does so the value of the old stock drops to zero.
Carter argues that these issues result in it being problematic to measure knowledge at the
level of the individual firm. This results in it being difficult to measure knowledge at the
national level as well since the individual firms’ accounts are the basis for the aggregate 
statistics and thus any inaccuracies in the firms’ accounts will compromise the national
accounts.
Haltiwanger and Jarmin (2000) examine the data requirement for the proper
measuring of the information economy. They point out that changes are needed in the
statistical accounts which countries use if we are to deal with the information\knowledge
economy. They begin by noting that improved measurement of many “traditional” items
in the national accounts is crucial if we are to understand fully IT’s impact on the
economy. It is only by relating changes in traditional measures such as productivity and
wages to the quality and use of IT that a comprehensive assessment of IT’s economic
impact can be made. For them, three main areas related to the information economy
require attention:
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1) The investigation of the impact of IT on key indicators of aggregate activity, such
as productivity and living standards,
2) The impact of IT on labour markets and income distribution and
3) The impact of IT on firm and on industry structures. 
Haltiwanger and Jarmin outline five areas where good data are needed: 
1) Measures of the IT infrastructure,
2) Measures of e-commerce,
3) Measures of firm and industry organisation, 
4) Demographic and labour market characteristics of individuals using IT, and
5) Price behaviour.
In Moulton (2000) the question is asked as to what improvements we can make to the
measurement of the information economy. In Moulton’s view additional effort is needed
on price indices and better concepts and measures of output are needed for financial and 
insurance services and other “hard-to-measure” services. Just as serious are the problems
of measuring changes in real output and prices of the industries that intensively use
computer services. In some cases output, even if defined, is not directly priced and sold 
but takes the form of implicit services which at best have to be indirectly measured and
valued. How to do so is not obvious. In the information economy, additional problems
arise. The provision of information is a service which in some situations is provided at
little or no cost via media such as the web. Thus on the web there may be less of a
connection between information provision and business sales. The dividing line between
goods and services becomes fuzzier in the case of e-commerce. When internet prices
differ from those of brick-and-mortar stores do we need different price indices for the
different outlets? Also the information economy may affect the growth of Business-to-
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Consumer sales, new business formation and in cross-border trade. Standard government
surveys may not fully capture these phenomena. Meanwhile the availability of IT
hardware and software results in the variety and nature of products being provided
changing rapidly. Moulton also argues that the measures of the capital stock used need to
be strengthened, especially for high-tech equipment. He notes that one issue with
measuring the effects of IT on the economy is that IT enters the production process often
in the form of capital equipment. Much of the data entering inventory and cost
calculations are rather meagre and needs to be expanded to improve capital stock
estimates. Yet another issue with the capital stock measure is that a number of the
components of capital are not completely captured by current methods, an obvious
example being intellectual property. Also research and development and other intellectual
property should be treated as capital investment though they currently are not. In addition
to all this Moulton argues that the increased importance of electronic commerce means
that the economic surveys used to capture its effects need to be expanded and updated.
In Peter Howitt’s view there are four main measurement problems for the
knowledge economy:
1) The “knowledge-input problem”,
2) The “knowledge-investment problem”,
3) The “quality improvement problem”,
4) The “obsolescence problem”.
To deal with these problems Howitt makes a call for better data. But it’s not clear that
better data alone is the answer, to both Howitt’s problems and the other issues outlined
here. Without a better theory of what the “knowledge economy” is and the use of this
theory to guide changes to the whole national accounting framework, it is far from
obvious that much improvement can be expected in the current situation.
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One simple question is to which industry or industries and\or sector or sectors of the
economy can we tie knowledge\information production? When considering this question
several problems arise. One is that the “technology” of information creation, transmission
and communication pervades all human activities so cannot fit easily into the national 
accounts categories. It is language, art, shared thought, and so on. It is not just production
of a given quantifiable commodity. Another issue is that because ICT exists along several 
different quantitative and qualitative dimensions production can not be added up. In
addition if much of the knowledge in society is tacit, known only to individuals, then it
may not be possible to measure in any meaningful way. If on the other hand knowledge is
embedded in an organisation via organisational routines see Becker (2004) for a review
of this literature, then again it may not be measurable. Organisational routines may allow
the knowledge of individual agents to be efficiently aggregated, much like markets
aggregate information, even though no one person has a detailed understanding of the
entire operation. In this sense, the organisation “possesses” knowledge which may not
exist at the level of the individual member of the organisation. Indeed if, as Hayek can be
interpreted as saying, much of the individual knowledge used by the organisation is tacit,
it may not even be possible for one person to obtain the knowledge embodied in a large
corporation.
There has also been considerable effort made to measure the information\knowledge
society by national and international organisation such as UNESCO, the UN and the EU.
That these efforts differ in their outcomes reflects, to a certain degree, different
understandings of what the knowledge society is and thus different ways of modelling it.
Some documents follow the process of knowledge production to sort out indicators,
themes and tend to include measures on i) prerequisites for knowledge production
(information infrastructure, knowledge, skill and human capital) and ii) knowledge
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production (R&D) itself. For example, in “Advancement of the Knowledge Society:
Comparing Europe, the US and Japan” (European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions 2004), all indicators are sorted by whether they measure
a prerequisite for the advancement of the knowledge society or whether they measure the
outcomes of a knowledge society.
Other documents use different criteria to select indicators. The UN model initiated
in “Understanding Knowledge Societies in Twenty Questions and Answers with the Index
of Knowledge Societies” (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2005), for
example, categorises indicators along three dimensions: assets, advancement and
foresightedness. When putting together its “Knowledge Society Barometer” (European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2004a), ‘The
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions’ considers
notions such as information, knowledge, knowledge-value societies and sustainable
development as parts of a ‘jigsaw puzzle’ which makes up their knowledge society
framework. It seems to indicate that the knowledge society is viewed as a result of the
integration of concerns of the previous conceptualisation of societies. Thus, the di erent
frameworks also suggest the influence of organisational agenda\priorities in defining the 
knowledge society.
Despite the difference in frameworks and indicators, there are some common
themes. These include human capital, innovation, ICT development and the context
dimension. The human capital theme includes variables on the levels of people’s skills
and education which reflects the size of the pool of educated people. Included in the 
innovation theme are variables showing innovation investment, procedures, capacities and
networks. There are diverse indicators under the ICT theme; yet, they can be categorised
as either resources or access. The former refers to the information infrastructure while the
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latter is related to the accessibility of information in people’s life and work. The context
dimension always includes variables on socio-economic, political and institutional
conditions for knowledge production.
Obviously, these themes are crucial for measuring the knowledge society. However,
these measures are not without their pitfalls. One basic problem for these measures is
caused by the “knowledge problem”. In some cases, knowledge is understood partially
and information and knowledge are treated as exchangeable terms. As a result, some
documents focused entirely on measuring the information economy while talking about
the knowledge economy and society. Other documents mentioned the difference between
tacit and explicit knowledge, the distinction between information and knowledge, and
thus, the distinction between the information society and the knowledge society while
they failed to employ appropriate variables to reflect the distinctions, due to data 
availability. Among these documents, we do see a gradually shifting understanding and
discourse on the knowledge society. For example, “UNESCO World Report: Towards
Knowledge Societies” could be seen as a leading document in initiating the paradigm
shift from the information society to the knowledge one. It acknowledges that “the idea of
the information society is based on technological breakthroughs. The concept of
knowledge societies encompasses much broader social, ethical and political dimensions”
(UNESCO 2005: 17). At the same time, another document prepared by UNESCO on
statistical challenges shows difficulties in identifying the relevant data within the existing
measurement frameworks.
In addition, the knowledge problem raises other issues to do with the choice of
indicators in each of the major themes. For example, human capital is measured
according to people’s formal education and skills based on human capital approaches.
This inevitably ignores people’s tacit knowledge and knowledge between people. There
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are a number of sociological studies which show that even within the economic domain
people are not rational actors but their economic performance is significantly affected by
social, cultural and political structures in which they are embedded
Similarly, the measurement of innovation in these documents seems to focus mainly
on the production of scientific knowledge in laboratories. This is inconsistent with the 
Mode-2 knowledge production initiated by Gibbons (1994) in the knowledge society in
which science and society co-evolve. Also the measurement of innovation fails to
distinguish the role of inventions from that of innovations. Consequently, it is difficult to
see how they can measure the economic value of innovation and at the same time attach a
social value to it. Regarding ICTs, it seems that the widely accepted practice is to
enumerate the physical infrastructure or, at best, measure access to information. There is a
misunderstanding on the relationship between technology and human beings here. It is
not technology but human beings and their interactions that constitute so-called society
and its institutions. Thus, the function of ICTs is not only their capacity to provide
additional new connections but also their potential for opening or closing forms of
personal, social and economic capacities, relationships and power-plays (Dutton, 2004).
Mansell and Wehn’s (1998) INEXSK approach would be a valuable endeavour to
integrate the dimension of human beings, their knowledge and ICTs in the knowledge
society measurement (Mansell and Wehn 1998).
Another problem with measures of the knowledge society is confusing the
knowledge economy with the knowledge society. Generally, there are two kinds of
documents on the measurement of the knowledge society. One group focuses on
measuring the knowledge economy although they mentioned the concept of the
knowledge society. The foci of the measurement are human capital, innovation and ICT
development. A representative document is “Measuring a Knowledge-based Economy
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and Society: An Australian Framework” prepared by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
The document’s author claims that this framework
“does not attempt to cover all knowledge in the economy and society . . .
[and] offer a comprehensive treatment of a knowledge-based society although
it does address those social elements which potentially affect economic
change or are affected by it” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002: 15)
Another group of documents considers both economic and technological features and
social conditions and outcomes of the knowledge society. Two representative documents
here would be, “Advancement of the Knowledge Society: Comparing Europe, the US and
Japan” (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
2004) and “Knowledge Society Barometer” (European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions 2004a) published by the European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. There are some variables reflecting 
social issues such as social inclusion, quality of life and gender equality in the two
documents. However, they failed to see that both the economic and the social are equally
important and integrated components in the measurement frameworks. Instead, the social
is still treated as the ‘leftover’ after having identified ‘significant’ and ‘measurable’ 
components for national accounting.
In light of these issues it would seem that a necessary first step along the path 
towards the correct measurement of the knowledge society\economy would entail the
development of a theory of the knowledge society\economy. Such a theory would tell us,
among other things, what the knowledge economy is, how - if at all - the knowledge
economy\knowledge society differ, how they change and grow, and what the important
measurable characteristics are. Based on this, a measurement framework could be
developed to deal with, at least some of, the problems outlined above.
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6 The (non)theory of the knowledge firm 
As has been emphasised by Carter (1996) it is problematic to measure knowledge at the
national level in part because it is difficult to measure knowledge at the level of the
individual firm. Part of the reason for this is that none of the orthodox theories of the firm 
offer us a theory of the “knowledge firm” to guide our measurement. 
The model of the “firm” found in most microeconomic textbooks does not incorporate 
knowledge - individual or institutional - or the knowledge worker; it can’t since it isn’t a
“theory of the firm” in any meaningful sense. The output side of the standard neoclassical 
model is a theory of supply rather than a true theory of the firm. In neoclassical theory, 
the firm is a ‘black box’ there to explain how changes in inputs lead to changes in outputs.
The firm is a conceptualisation that represents, formally, the actions of the owners of 
inputs who place their inputs in the highest value uses, and makes sure that production is
separated from consumption. The firm in neoclassical theory is no more or less than a
specialized unit of production, but it can be a one-person unit” (Demsetz 1995: 9).
Given there is no serious modelling of the firm in neoclassical theory, there is no
way to deal with the knowledge firm within this framework. There are no organisational
problems or any internal decision-making process, in fact, there is no organisational
structure at all and thus the advent of the knowledge economy cannot alter this
nonexistent structure. As there is no role for managers or employees there can be no
knowledge workers in the firm. But the growth in knowledge workers is one of the most 
important aspects in the development of the knowledge society. And their advent will
change the way we think about firms. 
Knowledge creators\workers\owners have the potential to be highly internationally
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mobile (unlike the physical capital or land in the old economy) which has the capacity to
either reduce the knowledge divide or increase it, but importantly at much higher speeds.
Buying the necessary knowledge creators\assimilators is like buying physical capital
except the ownership of the ‘means of production’ is now vested more with the capital
itself (human) than in the past modes of production. This has a number of important
implications including helping understand who wins and who loses from the knowledge
economy and this has the potential to affect our understanding\modelling of the
traditional ‘theory of the firm’ - in terms of the Grossman/Hart/Moore (GHM) approach -
which is vested in the ownership of physical capital alone.
The modern theory of the firm is based on the work of Grossman and Hart, (1986, 
1987) and Hart and Moore (1990). Within the GHM approach ownership is defined in 
terms of residual control over non-human assets, things such as machinery, inventories,
buildings, patents, client lists, firm’s reputation etc. Owner-managers employ labour that
cannot work without the physical capital these firms own. Dismissal\resignation of the
labour requires them to find other physical capital owning organisations (firms) to employ 
them. On liquidation of the firm, physical capital can be sold and the proceeds disbursed 
to the owners (shareholders). The standard theory of the firm is based on the role of non-
human capital in the firm. The definition of a firm, the determinants of the boundaries of a 
firm - that is, the determinants of vertical integration of firms, the meaning of ownership 
of the firm, the nature of authority within the firm are all functions of control rights over 
the firm’s non-human assets. Making non-human assets the centre of the theory means
that questions to do with the ownership and control of the physical information
technology can be addressed, but this concentration on non-human assets means that the
theory doesn’t deal with firms based on human assets. However it had noted from the
beginning that the theory could be extended to include human capital. As Hart (1988:
32
151) argues:
“. . . one difference with previous work is the emphasis on how integration
changes control over physical assets. This is in contrast to Coase’s 1937 paper
which focuses on the way integration changes an ordinary contractual
relationship into one where an employee accepts the authority of an employer
(within limits). Note that these approaches are not contradictory. Authority and
residual rights of control are very close and there is no reason why our analysis
of the costs and benefits of allocating residual rights of control could not be
extended to cover human, as well as physical, assets.”
Once we move to a situation where firms may own\need little physical capital, then
the modern theory of the firm loses much of its main reason for being. Once human 
capital (labour) becomes the most important\sole creator of wealth\value added then
modern economic theory is in need of modification. The theory does not, however, lose 
all relevance. As Hart (1995: 56-7) explains, at least some, nonhuman assets are essential
to a theory of the firm. To see why this may be so consider a situation where ‘firm’ 1 
acquires ‘firm’ 2, which consists entirely of human-capital. The question Hart raises is,
What is to stop firm 2’s workers from quitting? Without any physical assets, e.g.
buildings, firm 2’s workers would not even have to relocate themselves physically.
If these workers were linked by telephones or computers, which they themselves
own, they could simply announce one day that they had decided to become a new firm. 
For the acquisition of firm 2 by firm 1 to make economic sense there has to be a source of 
value in firm 2 over and above the human-capital of the workers. It makes little sense to
buy a ‘firm’ if that ‘firm’ can just get up and walk away. Hart argues there must be some 
‘glue’ holding firm 2’s workers in place. 
The value which acts as this glue may consist of as little as a place to meet; the
firm’s name, reputation, or distribution network; the firm’s files, containing important 
information about its operations or its customers; or even a contract that prohibits firm 2’s 
workers from working for competitors or from taking existing clients with them should
they quit. The source of value may even just represent the difficulty firm 2’s workers face 
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in co-ordinating a move to another firm. But, Hart points out, without something binding 
the firm together, the firm becomes a phantom, and as such we should expect that such
firms would be flimsy and unstable entities, constantly subject to the possibility of break-
up or dissolution.
Thus even a human-capital based firm will involve some nonhuman-capital, but the
human capital will play the dominate role. The important characteristic of human-capital
is that it embodies information and knowledge. A theory of the human-capital based firm 
has to model this co-existence of the human and nonhuman-capital. Brynjolfsson (1994)
deals with the issue by extending the property rights approach to the firm to include 
information whether this information is embodied in humans, in the form of human-
capital, or in artifacts. Rabin (1993) also works within the property rights framework, but
extends it by assuming that an agent has information about how to make production more
productive which they are willing to sell.
If the firm comprises human capital resources (eg., a legal or accounting firm) 
whose accumulated knowledge is the source of wealth, creation the balance of power
stemming from the “ownership of the means of production”, has changed. Likewise
predictions about what would happen at the dissolution of a knowledge-firm, is also 
unclear. Who has the rights to the sell-o of the assets, where these assets are embodied in
human beings? How can these assets be sold-off? These issues, although important in the
context of the economic theory of the firm may have less importance when trying to 
measure the size\scale of the knowledge economy. However they are likely to have
profound effects on the idea of a Knowledge Society where the balance of (economic)
power will change - owners of physical capital losing this to owners of human capital,
which without slavery map one-to-one to each individual. An individual’s own economic
power would likely vary with their different stocks of human capital as would the price
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they charge to hire it to others in the form of employment. This in turn affects who wins
and who loses from the knowledge society.
While the Brynjolfsson model is distinct from the Rabin model, they are
complementary. The relationship between information, ownership and authority is central
to both papers. Rabin works within a framework of an adverse selection model and shows
that the adverse selection problems can be such that, in some cases, an informed party has
to take over the firm to show that their information is indeed useful. The Brynjolfsson 
model is a moral hazard type framework which deals with the issue of incentives for an
informed party to maximise uncontractible effort.
As has been discussed Hart (1995: 17) noted that the neoclassical model tells us
nothing about where a firm’s boundaries will lie or about the size or location of a plant or 
factory within a given firm. This approach is consistent with every existing firm being a 
plant or division of one huge firm which produces everything. It is also consistent with 
every plant or division of each existing firm being a separate and independent firm in their 
own right. Thus it is not clear in what organisational form production will occur. Will it
be organised as a single large factory, several smaller factories or a household? The GHM
approach does delineate the boundaries of the firm but still does not tell us anything about 
the location or size of a plant or factory which is part of the firm. Again the form of 
production organisation is indeterminate. What will be argued below is that the division
of knowledge is one important influence on the form of organisation in which production 
takes place. The most obvious issue has to do with the determination of whether or not
work occurs in a centralised factory or in separate households or some combination. This
has been an issue since at least the industrial revolution.
The development of ICTs has meant that the costs of moving people as opposed to
moving information have risen sharply. The costs involved in sending and receiving
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information have fallen thanks to technologies such as email and the Internet along with
falls in the costs of long distance phone calls and the expanding use of cellular networks.
The costs of people moving have not fallen however. Commuting to work via congested
city and suburban streets, for example, is at least as difficult as it was two decades ago.
The increasing interest in congestion pricing in many cities around the world suggests
that traffic problems are not lessening. The ever increasing relative cost of moving people
would suggest that the size of the “unit of production” should be moving away from the
large factory, so dominant for the last two centuries, towards more home based
production, as in the period before the industrial revolution.
The previous sections have briefly outlined the effects of the increasing importance
of knowledge for the mainstream theory of the firm. It was argued that the neo-classical
production function approach is not a true theory of the firm, but rather the firm is 
portrayed as a uninvestigated perfectly efficient ‘black box’ which simply turns inputs
into outputs without organisation structure. The extensions of the GHM framework
offered by Brynjolfsson (1994) and Rabin (1993) inherits the implicit owner\manager
restriction of the original GHM framework and thus are of limited value when modelling
the knowledge firm. When we turn to the location of production the models suggest that
we should, in general terms, see a movement back towards home production but we are
not given a specific relationship between knowledge and plant size or production location. 
We are left with an unsatisfactory model of the (knowledge) firm and thus we are 
unable to give guidance on either empirical or policy questions that flow, via changes to 
the firm, from the development of the knowledge economy. Firm’s organisational 
structures are changing in response to the increased prominence of information and
knowledge in the production process. In the new economy, not only will we see changes
in the location of production, but even if production still takes place within a traditional
36
firm, a factory or office, that firm may have a very different structure and organisation
from that which we see today. Rajan and Zingales (2003: 87) argue that we are in fact
seeing a new “kinder, gentler firm”. This is in response to the increase in the importance 
of human capital, along with increased competition and access to finance, all of which 
have increased the worker’s importance and improved the outside options for workers,
thereby changing the balance of power within firms. In Rajan and Zingales’s view “[t]he 
single biggest challenge for the owners or top management today is to manage in an
atmosphere of diminished authority. Authority has to be gained by persuading lower
managers and workers that the workplace is an attractive one and one that they would
hate to lose. To do this, top management has to ensure that work is enriching, that
responsibilities are handed down, and rich bonds develop among workers and between
themselves and workers” (Rajan and Zingales 2003: 87).
Cowen and Parker (1997) make a similar point about changing organisational
structures. For them, “[i]nformation as a factor of production is making old functional
structures and methods of organisation and planning redundant in many areas of business.
The successful use of knowledge involves not only its generation, but also its
mobilisation and integration, requiring a change in the way it is handled and processed.”
(Cowen and Parker 1997: 12). Organisational change, as far as Cowen and Parker are
concerned, is the consequence of the increasing need to make use of market principles
within the firm and the growing importance of human capital. They note that as far as a 
firm’s labour force is concerned, “[t]he emphasis now is upon encouraging knowledge 
acquisition, skills and adaptability in the workforce as critical factors in competitive
advantage.” (Cowen and Parker 1997: 32). Firms are obliged to rely more on market
based mechanisms as the most efficient way of processing and transmitting information
and giving the firm the flexibility and yet also focus it requires. Companies are 
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decentralising their management systems as a way of coping with the uncertainty and
pace of change in their markets. The aim is to ensure that those with the require
knowledge and right incentives are the ones making the decisions and taking
responsibility for the outcomes. Cowen and Parker (1997: 25-8) emphasise how advances
in ICTs underlie the ability to be able to combine the advantages of this organisational
flexibility with mass production. 
But little of these types of changes are captured or explained by the mainstream
theory of the firm. Expanding the orthodox view of the firm to include the new reality of 
the knowledge economy should be an urgent issue on the economic research agenda. It
should be noted that such changes to the firm help determine who are the “winners and
losers” from economic change in general. As in all previous “economic revolutions”, this
is the ultimate issue to do with the knowledge economy.
7 Points of departure and potential for progress
The discussion above suggests that some of the important features and issues that arise
with the movement towards a information\knowledge based society are:
1. The increasing (but not exclusive) importance of ICTs in economic and social
activities. The access to such technologies will be both enabling (GPTs) and have the
potential for exclusion and differential effects - ‘winners and losers’. This is not new -
the introduction of new technologies has lead historically to winners and losers, both
in the short and longer term.
2. The increasing proportion of ‘human capital’ involved in productive activities.
3. The changing role and importance (and ownership) of intellectual property in
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productive activities. When information is a key input in economic activity its
ownership and control will assume greater importance. Intellectual ‘property’ v.
Intellectual ‘commons’ will affect access to this resource and there will be winners
and losers in the Information Economy as a consequence.
4. The changing nature of the ‘theory of the firm’. The current economic theory of the
firm is based upon firms having ownership and control of physical capital where 
‘workers’ are employed by owner-managers to work with this owned physical
capital. As we move to ‘human-capital intensive’ firms, the modern theory of the firm 
is left without much of its theoretical substance. The distinction between owners (of
capital) and workers (human capital) becomes blurred and economic theory stumbles.
5. The Information Economy has typically focused upon ICTs, however, the KBE surely
stretches into biogenetic engineering issues where intellectual property, human capital
and ‘knowledge’ have a dominant role. The economic and social impacts of genetic
engineering and nanotechnology have typically not been established.
6. Measuring the extent and effects of the KBE can be done either directly
(physical\monetary values of its effects - both positive and negative) and\or indirectly
via the consequences of the growth of knowledge where it impinges upon areas such
as work practices, employment patterns, social inclusion,
health\wellbeing\crime\surveillance, environmental and especially energy use
consequences etc.
From this it is clear that the key to a quantitative measure of the size, extent and effects of
a KBE is a theoretical definition which would necessarily have an important (but not
exclusive) role for ICTs; a measure of the size and distribution of ‘human capital’ and
some boundaries where knowledge does and does not contribute to the economy\society.
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On the basis of currently available data from the System of National Accounts
(SNA) we can measure “OECD-type” measures of the Information Economy. It is
generally quite easy to measure the extent and growth of ICT-related goods and services
such as, computers per person; internet hosts; IP addresses; email addresses; internet
companies; mobile phones, etc., but without other data on things such as speed of
connection; use of computers, these summary measures remain simply that, a largely
uninformative summary. Furthermore, what are the critical levels of these measures that
determine when the economy is to be deemed an “Information Economy” or a
“developing Information Economy”? To answer these questions requires a clearer
theoretical base to inform the statistical measurement.
We can focus more explicitly on some possible implications of a more networked
economy\society. Possible indicators include the composition of labour force transitions
including; Hours worked; Flexible work environment (i.e., home based work); Service
workers; Knowledge intensive versus non-knowledge intensive sectors. In addition the size,
composition and growth of new and emerging sectors could be measured and tracked. The
role of ICTs as General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) is postulated to have had effects
(mostly delayed) on productivity. One way to track the influence of knowledge on the 
economy is to measure productivity effects via Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as well as
direct measures of technological change2.
A key feature of the KBE is the prominence of human capital. Discussion of the role
of human capital has a long history in economics going back to at least Smith (1776) and its
measurement goes back even further, beginning with Petty (1690). For up-to-date surveys
on the area see Woßmann (2003) and Le et al (2003). However, these types of measures
remain mainly ‘academic’ and the national systems of accounts would typically only
2 There are difficulties, however, in using TFP as a measure of technological change see for example, Carlaw and Lipsey (2004)
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include such things as occupational and industry level employment\participation\hours of
work data; employment by ethnicity; regional employment differences; qualifications of the 
employed workforce. These educationally related data can be enhanced directly from
University Calendars; educational attainment and curricula composition shift data (from say
arts to computer science etc.), however, these are typically anonymous and not linked to
specific industry employment\output effects.
8 Conclusions
It should be clear from what has been said above that one of the most pressing problems
faced when dealing with the whole notion of a knowledge economy\society is the lack of
a theory of both the knowledge firm and the knowledge economy\society, more generally.
Without such a theory, measuring the knowledge economy and saying anything useful in
terms of policy seems impossible. We are in a world of ‘measurement without theory’, as
Koopmans put it. Much of what passes for measurement of the knowledge society is
based not on a rigourous theory of the knowledge society, which determines what should
be measured and how it should be measured, but more on whatever data is convenient and
available. This approach greatly limits the value to economic and sociological research on
the knowledge society, of any conclusions it might reach, as well as offering little in the
way of guidance to policy makers. It has lead to a debate which is characterised by
confusing definitions and underdeveloped theorising. This debate has failed to adequately 
distinguish between the changing role of information within contemporary economies
associated with the rise of new communication technologies, the place of knowledge as a
component within economic production linked to the shift to human capital as the key
cause of innovation and change, and the wider concern to create a society that values
open access to increased knowledge for all. Building a more comprehensive “nested”
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definition of the interrelated elements that make up the KBE\KS is necessary to ensure
that public policy and debate about future “transformational” strategies is structured to
ensure that outcomes can be monitored, and achieved in the most effective manner.
Unlike many authors we do not see the problems being resolved by simply gathering
better data. Without well thought out theory, the data we would be seeking to find would 
be yet another “known unknown”.
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